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THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY: A NOTE ON THE-UNITED STATES'
APPROACH TO THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Matthew Linkie
INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1998, the Pentagon merged three cold war agencies
into a new $1.9 billion-per-year Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA) to address growing weapons proliferation problems and to
meet the threat from weapons of mass destruction in the hands of ter-
rorist and rogue nations.' Speaking to DTRA employees in connection
with the creation of the new agency, Secretary of Defense, William S.
Cohen stated
Today's harsh reality is too powerful to ignore: at least
25 countries have, or are in the process of developing,
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the means
to deliver them .... We must confront these threats in
places like Baghdad before they come to our shores.
Because America should not rush into the future with-
out being rooted in the proven strengths of the past, we
turn to you - the proven professionals.2
The DTRA merges, the Defense Technology Security Administra-
tion (DTSA),3 the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA),4 and
* J.D. 1999 Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America; B.A. 1994 Villanova University.
1. See Walter Pincus, Pentagon Merges Cold War Units Into 'Threat
Reduction'Agency, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1998, at A2.
2. Department of Defense (DOD), Establishment of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Research Intelligence Database, Oct. 1, 1998, available in
1998 WL 674356 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript of the Department of Defense an-
nouncement on the establishment of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency).
3. See DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 2, 1998, available in
1998 WL 16525670. The DTSA is headed by Dave Tarbel and was set up
during the Cold War to prevent militarily useful technology from leaving the
United States and reaching terrorist organizations. See id.
4. See id. The DSWA, formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency, formed
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the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) 5 into one central agency. Its
creation sparks a new integrated approach to uncovering chemical and
biological stockpiles of weapons and preventing their use.6
,The establishment of the DTRA is evidence of the nation's dedica-
tion to reducing the threat of a chemical or biological attack on the
United States. 7 Its establishment, however, also acknowledges Amer-
ica's vulnerability to such a threat8 and the concern that our nation
may be ill-prepared to protect its citizens. 9 In the past, the U.S. relied
on geography, international treaties, and international conventions for
protection from a possible biological or chemical attack.'0 Most geo-
graphic defenses, however, are outdated and the relevant treaties inef-
when the Manhattan Project first began. See id. It has been the United States'
lead agency for dealing with nuclear weapons, deterrence, stockpiling and
other nuclear weapons issues. See id. The DSWA's field command is at Kirt-
land Air Force Base and employs an estimated 395 military and civilian per-
sonnel. See Special Weapons Part of New Agency, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 3,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16509805. The Field Command primarily re-
searches and simulates weapon effects at Kirtland and White Sands Missile
Range. See id. As part of the DTRA, DSWA helps address the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. See IG Report Says DSWA Response to Y2K
Problem Inadequate, ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, Nov. 19, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 17229092.
5. See DOD News Briefing, Oct. 2, 1998, supra note 3. Developed to-
wards the end of the Cold War, OSIA was created to oversee inspection pro-
grams associated with arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union.
See id. The OSIA was a key player in developing confidences and reassur-
ances between the two superpowers during the Cold War. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. (announcing the creation of the DTRA).
8. New US Agency to Deal with Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16611007. The
Director of the DTRA, Jay Davis, stated, "[T]he deterrent capability of the
United States is still very effective against national states. It's not so clear that
it has the same effect on transnational organizations." Id.
9. See Bryan Bender, DOD Seeks Guidance on Threat Reduction, JANE'S
DEFENSE WKLY., July 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7900819 (discussing the
DOD's move to create the DTRA in response to criticism that the Agency is
overlooking key issues in countering the proliferation of nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons).
10. See generally United Nations: Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, 32 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L 800 (1993) [hereinafter Chemical
Weapons Convention].
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
fective. l For example, because all countries are not parties to these
treaties, some countries may disregard them.' 2 Compliance by coun-
tries that are parties to such treaties is difficult to monitor and "cheat-
ing" is not easily detected, 13 as the procedures required to check com-
pliance under current treaties are generally cumbersome.' 4 The treaties
essentially have failed in their attempt to discover chemical and bio-
logical weapons facilities and to stop proliferation." Further, the trea-
ties do not extend to non-statist terrorist organizations. A new ap-
proach is necessary.
The unique characteristics of chemical and biological weapons
make the establishment of the DTRA a necessity. First, these weapons
are easy to produce and do not require large, expensive facilities.'
6
11. See Kevin J. Fitzgerald, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Inade-
quate Protection from Chemical Warfare, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
425, 446 (1996) (discussing the ineffectiveness of international treaties); see
also Andrea Stone, U.S. Encounters Mideast Reluctance to Military Action,
USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1998, at A12 (discussing Iraq's refusal to permit U.N.
inspectois to search for weapons of mass destruction).
12. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 446 (identifying Libya and other
countries not party to U.N. treaties).
13. See Richard A. Falk, Inhibiting Reliance on Biological Weaponry: the
Role and Relevance of International Law, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 17, 18
(1986) (discussing the difficulty of substantiating violations of international
law).
14. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, at art. XII(4) (pro-
viding, "[tihe Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue,.
. to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Na-
tions Security Council.") Id.
15. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 429. For example, although the U.S.
contends Iraq is building chemical and biological weapons, it has thus far
been unable to prevent their proliferation under the U.N. procedures. See
Stone, supra note 11, at A12.
16. See David G. Gray, Note, "Then the Dogs Died": The Fourth Amend-
ment and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 567, 574 (1994) (discussing the characteristics of chemical weapons).
"[Y]ou can make the basic compounds [of chemical weapons] in a kitchen sink
or a high school lab." Id. (citing Robin Wright, Chemical Arms Race Heating
Up, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1988, pt. 1, at 1, 6); see also W. Edward Montz Jr. and
Frank A. Lewis, The Emerging Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism, 14
ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY 6 (1998) (discussing the ease and
commercial availability of chemical agents). "A number of chemical agents
are commercially available or easy to make with just a basic knowledge of
chemistry." Id.
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They can be developed and produced almost anywhere - in laborato-
ries, basements or small-scale industrial facilities. 17 Mustard gas, for
example, can be synthesized by simply mixing two chemicals.' 8 In ad-
dition, these weapons involve chemicals and biological substances
with commercial uses and are readily available throughout the world. 19
Second, chemical weapon facilities are extremely difficult to detect.
20
Because the technologies needed to produce these weapons often have
commercial applications, their use as weapons can be easily denied.2'
Third, small quantities of such weapons can be extremely effective 22
and lethal.2 a Fourth, chemical and biological weapons can be delivered
by a variety of means and come in a variety of forms.24 Furthermore,
their effects may go undetected for minutes (in the case of chemical
agents) or for days (in the case of biological agents), 25 making these
weapons particularly attractive to terrorists. Lastly, response tactics
vary greatly depending upon the type of chemical or biological
17. See Gray, supra note 16, at 574 (citing Chemical Warfare: Ban the
World's Machine Guns: Can't Be Done? As Easy as Trying to Get an Effective
Global Ban on Chemical Weapons, THE ECONOMIST, June 4, 1988,'at 20).
18. See Gray, supra note 16, at 574 (citation omitted).
19. See id. at 575 (citation omitted).
20. See id. (citation omitted).
21. See id. (citation omitted) (stating that any production facility could be
dual-purpose, readily switching from the manufacture of chemical weapons to
the production of aspirin).
22. See DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 9, 1998, available in
1998 WL 14095268. ("Five pounds of anthrax, properly dispersed, would kill
over 200,000 in Washington D.C."). Id.
23. See Vaccine Improves Odds Against Anthrax, REGULATORY
INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, Apr. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 194056
(F.D.C.H.) (discussing the chance of survival after inhaling anthrax used as a
biological weapon). "When inhaled, an unvaccinated, unprotected person has
about a one percent chance of surviving a concentrated anthrax exposure." Id.
24. See Montz and Lewis, supra note 16, at 6 (discussing the forms of
chemical and biological agents). Chemical agents can be solid, liquid or vapor.
See id. Solids and liquids are put into suspension as aerosols; some liquid
aerosols may change to a vapor state. See id.
25. See Vaccine Improves Odds Against Anthrax, supra note 23. "You
wouldn't see it, smell it or feel it in the air. But just the same, one deep breath
is enough to kill you." Id. "One of the hardest things about a chemical and
biological event is that unlike a bomb going off, you're not sure what happened
and when it happened." DOD News Briefing, supra note 3.
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weapon, making training and defense preparation extremely difficult.
26
Prior to the establishment of the DTRA, the United States' primary
protection from biological and chemical warfare rested with multiple
agencies in the intelligence community and the Department of Defense
(DOD). 27 These agencies relied on legislation such as the 1996 De-
fense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act28 and the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997;29 presidential
executive orders such as Executive Order No. 12,868; 30 and interna-
tional treaties including the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 3' the 1972 Bio-
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention,3 2 and the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention.
33
The creation of the DTRA is the result of extensive Congressional
26. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 3. "It takes fundamentally differ-
ent tactics if its a chemical terrorist weapon or.a biological terrorist weapon...
• If it's a chemical weapon, you want to get people out of the area as soon as
possible. If it's a biological weapon, you want to contain people in the area."
Id.
27. See id. (discussing the organizations responsible for reducing key
threats to national security).
28. Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C.
§ 2301 etseq. (1996).
29. Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, S.
495, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
30. Exec. Order No. 12,868, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,749 (1993) (repealed).
31. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As-
phyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacterial Methods of Warfare,
June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol], reprinted in
United States: Ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacterial
Methods of Warfare, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L. 49, 49 (1975).
32. 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 26 U.S.T. 583 (Apr.
10, 1972). Introduced in 1972 and ratified by the U.S. in 1975, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention banned the use of biological weapons by pro-
hibiting the "development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention" of
biological weapons for offensive purposes. See Colonel Guy B. Roberts, The
Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the
Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENV.
J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 483, 499 (1999); see also Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (visited Mar. 22, 2000)
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/bwcl.htm> (text of convention).
33. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10.
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testimony by defense officials, 34 scientists and public health officials,
35
and recent legislation,36 all demanding a new approach for defending
against biological and chemical weapons. In addition, the attacks on
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the sarin gas
attack in Tokyo,37 and the events of the Gulf War38 encouraged offi-
cials to reevaluate the nation's chemical and biological weapons de-
fense capabilities.
39
The push for establishment of the DTRA began with the Defense
Reform Initiative of 1997 (DRI). 40 In addition to the cost-saving
measures outlined by the DRI, the Secretary of Defense also recog-
nized the current defense infrastructure's inability to prepare and de-
34. See, e.g., Quarterly Readiness Reporting System: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Military Readiness of the House National Security Comm., 105th
Cong. (1998) (statement of Louis C. Finch, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
for Readiness).
35. See, e.g., TRICARE Program, 1998: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Military Personnel of the House National Security Comm., 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Edward D. Martin, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs).
36. See generally 50 U.S.C. § 2301; see also Chemical and Biological
Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, supra note 29.
37. The AUM Shinrikyo nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system
aimed to kill thousands of people and scare the population away from public
transportation. See Paul Rogers, The Next Terror Weapon Will be Biological.
And it Could be Used Soon, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 1998).
38. See Fact Sheet on Gulf War Ongoing Initiatives, Mar. 7, 1997 avail-
able in 1997 WL 895616 (F.D.C.H.). Since the Gulf War, DOD has increased
its attention on biological warfare defense and other force-protection measures.
See Anthrax Vaccination Program Facts, REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE
DATABASE, Department of Defense (Dec. 16, 1997), available in 1997 WL
890912 (F.D.C.H.).
39. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 22.
40. See William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Defense Reform Initiative of
1997. Primarily, the DRI was meant as a cost-cutting measure. See Bradley
Graham, Retired Admiral Pushes Pentagon to Run a Tighter Ship; Cohen Aide
Launches Several Reforms, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1998, at A19. The initiative
included plans to: (1) eliminate one-third of the 3,000 jobs in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, (2) make substantial reductions in military headquarters
staffs and thirteen Defense agencies, (3) switch from reams of paper to elec-
tronic networks for issuing regulations, (4) order items and pay bills, (5) pri-
vatize utility systems at military bases, and (6) establish a chancellor for edu-
cation and professional development to oversee the department's thirty civilian
schools. See id.
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fend from an attack such as the one in Tokyo.41 In particular, the Sec-
retary noted that the agencies currently in charge of countering this
new threat were formed to protect the nation from a nuclear attack
rather than chemical or biological warfare.42 Thus, the bureaucracies
responsible for monitoring the nation's defense capabilities required
restructuring. Testimony noted the proven frailty of existing treaties in
protecting the United States against a chemical or biological attack.43
The DRI and the Secretary's testimony made it clear that, although the
threats are by no means new, our methods for combating them must
be.
The development of the DTRA to meet these threats, however, pres-
ents numerous questions and considerations. The first concern is
whether large scale spending to fund the DTRA is necessary or
whether spending to educate health officials on how to respond to an
attack would be more appropriate. Questions relating to jurisdiction
and feasibility, as well as potential infringements upon international
treaties and conventions also arise. Another problem is how the DTRA
will work with other U.S. government intelligence agencies, federal
law enforcement, and state public health officials to enforce its find-
ings. This Note proposes potential answers to these questions.
Part I of this Note presents a history of biologicaltand chemical war-
fare and describes potential public health effects. This Part examines
current law and U.S. capabilities to protect the nation from the threat
of weapons of mass destruction. Part II explains the development of
the DTRA, its mission, goals, organization, and intended impact on
current law. Part III analyzes the need for the DTRA, specifically, how
current capabilities to defend against terrorist chemical and biological
weapons attacks are insufficient, and considers areas in which the
DTRA can succeed where international treaties have failed. In addi-
tion, Part III questions whether funds are being spent appropriately on
the DTRA, or whether this money could be spent more effectively on
public health and readiness programs. This Part discusses the prob-
41. See 50 U.S.C. § 2301 (listing congressional findings leading up to the
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act).
42. See U.S. DOD: Defense Dept. Makes Progress with Reform Actions,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16527105 (stating,
"Cohen is realigning the Department to better execute its post-Cold War mis-
sions. Agencies and offices that were designed to operate in a bi-polar world
are now being merged or restructured to meet the realities of today's threats.").
43. See id.
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lems the DTRA will face in meeting its goals, particularly with regard
to jurisdiction, enforcement, and feasibility issues. Part IV concludes
that the establishment of the DTRA is necessary for effective reduc-
tion of the threat from chemical and biological weapons. Furthermore,
Part IV finds that similar efforts must be made to increase the capa-
bilities of the United States' health facilities to respond to a chemical
or biological attack in the United States.
I. PREPARING FOR THE THREAT
A. The History and Health Risks of Biological and Chemical
Warfare
Biological and chemical weapons historically have played a signifi-
cant role in military operations. 4 Medieval armies poisoned their
enemies' drinking water with the dead bodies of humans and
animals. 45 In ancient times, armies burned sulfur and tar, choking their
enemies with smoke.46 In the eighteenth century, the British army
spread disease among the Native American tribes by distributing blan-
kets contaminated with smallpox.
47
Nations recognized the need to regulate the use of such tactics in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries however, the Hague
Conferences of 189948 and 190749 and the Geneva Protocol of
192550 did not effectively deter their use. The use of chemical and
biological weapons by the Germans during World War I,"' and the
44. See ROBIN CLARKE, THE SILENT WEAPONS 12-16 (1968) (discussing
the origins of toxic warfare).
45. See id. at 14. During the medieval period, poisoning water supplies
was a standard military tactic. See id.; see also DOD News Briefing, supra
note 22 (discussing how during the middle ages, cadavers were catapulted over
besieged city walls to spread death and disease).
46. See id. (examining the Spartans' use of noxious fumes from smolder-
ing pitch and sulfur to attack the Athenians).
47. See CLARKE, supra note 44, at 14-16.
48. The First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899, reprinted
in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 103, 105 (Supp. 1907).
49. The Second International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907, re-
printed in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 106 (Supp. 1908).
50. Geneva Protocol, supra note 31.
51. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 429-30 (discussing the German use of
chemical weapons in 1915). Germany sidestepped the Hague Conference's
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Italians in 1935 against Ethiopia,52 evidenced this failure and helped
usher in the modern era of chemical warfare and abuses of interna-
tional law. 3
Since these events, chemical weapons technology has progressed
greatly,54 allowing nations to build up massive stockpiles and conduct
intensive research on possible chemical and biological agents. This
trend, however, has not been limited to large nations. Developing
countries such as Libya began to manufacture chemical weapons as
well.55 In addition, the first large scale use of chemical weapons by a
terrorist group 56 was exhibited when the Aum Shinrikyo Cult 7 de-
ployed sarin gas58 in a Tokyo subway station59 in 1995. Later, in July
ban on chemical warfare by using chlorine filled canisters positioned along a
four mile front rather than projectiles during the chemical attack. See id. The
German Army waited for the wind to blow towards the French positions, then
opened the canisters releasing a cloud of chlorine gas over the French troops.
See id.
52. See id. (discussing Italy's use of chemical weapons in 1935). Italy
used chemical weapons in its conquest of Ethiopia, despite the Geneva Proto-
col's ban on their use. See id.
53. See id. at 430-32. In addition, Japan used poison gas against China
(1937-45) as did Iraq against Iran (1982-83). See Falk, supra note 13, at 23.
54. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 22 (discussing the use of new
technologies as strategic weapons rather than tactical maneuvers).
55. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 443 (citation omitted).
56. Not until the Aum Shinrikyo cult confessed to the subway attack did
analysts discover the same cult was responsible for an attack with VX gas
against a twenty-eight year old man in December 1994. See David L. Chan-
dler, Japan Cult May Have Used Agent Found in Sudan, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
26, 1998, at A14. "In that attack, the chemical agent VX was sprayed directly
on the victim's skin." Id. "The man lost consciousness immediately and died
ten days later." Id.
57. Founded by Shoko Asahara (whose real name is Chizuo Matsumoto),
the Aum Shinrikyo cult is believed to have up to $1 billion in assets and as
many as 16,000 members in Russia. See Jeff Nesmith, Target America: Bio-
chemical Warfare, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 2, 1998, at E2; see also Chris
Betros, Death Sentence Urged for Cult Killer. Former Member First to Face
Call for Capital Punishment in Aum Shinri Kyo Trials, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 7, 1998, at 12.
58. During the March 20, 1995 Tokyo subway attack, canisters with elec-
tric fans placed in three subway lines converging in central Tokyo began dis-
persing Sarin nerve gas. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 445. The attack in-
jured 5,000 and killed twelve. See id. See Subcomm. on Labor, Health and
Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the Senate Comm. on
2000]
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1998, more than sixty people were poisoned by cyanide at an outdoor
summer festival in Japan. 60 These abuses have not been limited to for-
eign countries and terrorist organizations. The use of riot control
agents and herbicides by the U.S. in Vietnam violated the 1925 Ge-
neva Protocol.6 ' In addition, chemical weapons have been used by
domestic terrorists in the U.S.
62
B. US. Legislation
In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of
Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1998) (Statement of Richard Jackson). The cult
also attempted to obtain biological agents, such as Ebola, anthrax, and botulin
from a United States military base in Japan. See Nesmith, supra note 57, at E2;
see also S. Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and
Related Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1998)
(Statement of James M. Hughes).
59. See Rogers, supra note 37, at 14. Although it did not achieve its in-
tended result, "the Tokyo subway attack was the first substantial example of
the use of a weapon of mass destruction." Id.
60. See Willis Witter, Four Die After Meal at Festival in Japan. Police
Suspect Cyanide Was Put in Pot of Curry, WASH. TIMES, July 28, 1998, at
A13.
61. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 434-35. The actions of the United
States, however, "did not technically breach the Geneva Protocol because the
United States did not ratify the treaty until after the war, in January 1975." Id.
(citing Philip Louis Reizenstein, Note, Chemical and Biological Weapons-
Recent Legal Developments May Prove to be a Turning Point in Arms Control,
12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 95, 98, n.18 (1986). In addition, the United States inter-
preted the Geneva protocol not to preclude irritants or herbicides because theii
effects are not similar to more lethal chemical agents like nerve gas. See id.
62. See US. Readies Defense Against Germ Warfare; Terrorism Experts
Say Small Scale Attack More Likely, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 22, 1998, at A6
(stating that "the only real bioterrorism incident in U.S. history occurred in
1984, when members of the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon sprayed salmonella
bacteria on 10 local salad bars in an effort to dampen voter turnout and throw
an election their way."); see also Marie Isabelle Chevrier, The Threat That
Won't Disperse: Why Biological Weapons Have Taken Center Stage, WASH.
POST, Dec. 21, 1997, at Cl (discussing contamination of salad bars in Oregon
by a cult and poisoning of lab workers in Texas by food laced with a germ that
causes a rare form of dysentery); see also Reporter's Notebook: Chem-bio, Not
As Easy As Pie, DEFENSE WEEK, Vol. 19 No. 14, April 16, 1998 (discussing
how the World Trade Center bombers had attempted to cause an explosion
followed by dispersal of a chemical agent, but that the blast from the explosion
destroyed the chemical agent).
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Mass Destruction Act of 199663 to help defend against the threat of
nuclear, chemical, and biological (NCB) weapons. 64 The Nunn-Lugar
Amendment to the Act included significant Congressional findings
supporting the establishment of the DTRA.65 In particular, Congress
found that weapons of mass destruction66 in the hands of hostile na-
tions and terrorist groups pose an increasing threat to the U.S. 67 Con-
gress also found that the U.S. lacked adequate planning and counter-
measures to address the threat of chemical and biological weapons.68
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment proposed an "emergency response as-
sistance program" to aid domestic preparedness by providing civilian
personnel and state and local agencies with training and expert advice
regarding emergency responses to the use of weapons of mass de-
struction. 69 In addition, the amendment authorized extensive funding
70
and military assistance"1 to aid in increasing the nation's preparedness.
63. Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 2301 - 66 (1996).
64. See id. at § 2311.
65. See Nunn-Lugar Amendment No. 4349, S. 1745, 104th Cong. (1996).
66. 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) defines weapons of mass destruction as "any
weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or seri-
ous bodily injury to a significant number of people by the release, dissemina-
tion, or impact of- (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a
disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity."
67. See 50 U.S.C. § 2301(1), (5).
68. See 50 U.S.C. § 2301(19). Although Congress noted that the Depart-
ment of Energy has established a Nuclear Emergency Response Team, no
comparable unit exists for emergencies involving biological or chemical weap-
ons. See § 2301(20). In addition Congress noted that state and local emer-
gency response personnel are not adequately prepared or trained to handle in-
cidents involving such materials. See § 2301(21); see also US. Lags in Bio-
logical Warfare Protection Threat Said to Be on the Rise, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 27, 1997, at A6 (stating, "the United States is poorly
prepared to defend its armed forces from the rising threat of germ warfare at-
tack and lags even more in protecting Americans at home.").
69. See 50 U.S.C. § 2311.
70. For example, the Act authorizes $35 million for the emergency re-
sponse assistance program. See 50 U.S.C. § 2312(h). The Act also authorizes
$15 million for a nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency response pro-
gram. See 50 U.S.C. § 2313(c).
71. Section 2313 authorizes military assistance to civilian law enforcement
in emergency situations involving biological or chemical weapons. See id. at §
2313(a).
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It urged the United States Sentencing Commission to provide in-
creased criminal penalties for offenses relating to importing and ex-
porting biological and chemical weapons as well as the technology
used to create them.72 Clearly, these provisions placed a new and
greater emphasis on identifying the threat of chemical and biological
weapons and remedying the lack of U.S. capabilities to respond to
such a threat.
A second piece of legislation, the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Threat Reduction Act of 1997," 3 gives even greater priority to de-
fending against chemical and biological weapons. For example, the
Act provides criminal and civil penalties for "the unlawful acquisition,
transfer, or use of any chemical weapon or biological weapon. 74
Congress recognized that the use of chemical and biological weap-
ons contravenes international law and that their use "is abhorrent and
should trigger immediate and effective sanctions. 75 The Act was a
response to President Clinton's Executive Order 12,868, declaring a
national emergency in response to "the unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States" posed by the proliferation of NCB weapons and of the
means for delivering such weapons. 76 Congress reviewed the intelli-
gence community's findings that numerous countries possess these
weapons and the means to deliver them.77 Congress also noted that the
1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act underscored
the "urgent need to improve domestic preparedness" to protect against
chemical and biological threats.78 The new Act expanded on the 1996
legislation and aimed to reduce the threat of biological and chemical
72. See id. at § 2332.
73. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997,
supra note 29.
74. Id.
75. Id. at (2).
76. Exec. Order No. 12,868, 58 Fed. Reg. 51749 (Sept. 30, 1993)(revoked
and replaced by Exec. Order 12930).
77. See The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of
1997, supra note 29, Section 2 at (7) (finding that China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Russia possess chemical and biological weap-
ons and the means to deliver them. Four countries in the Middle East - Iran,
Iraq, Libya, and Syria - have also supported international terrorism as a na-
tional policy.) See id. at § (8).
78. See id. at § (11).
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warfare by authorizing criminal penalties of imprisonment or death in
the case of an action that results in the death of another person. 79 The
Act authorizes civil penalties of up to $100,000 for each violation
8 0
and the forfeiture and destruction of property involved in the offense."'
Further, other economic sanctions may be imposed. 2
Congress made significant findings regarding the future threat of
chemical and biological weapons.8 3 For example, regarding prepared-
79. Section 229A (a)(1) states "[a]ny person who violates section 229 of
this title shall be fined ... or imprisoned for any term of years or both." Id
Section 229A(a)(2) states "[a]ny person who violates section 229 of this title
and by whose action the death of another person is the result shall be punished
by death or imprisoned for life." Id.
80. Section 229A (b)(1) states
The Attorney General may bring a civil action in the ap-
propriate United States District Court against any person
who violates section 229 of this title and, upon proof of
such violation by a preponderance of the evidence, such
person shall be subject to pay a civil penalty in an amount
not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation.
81. Section 229B(a) states "[a]ny person convicted under section 229A(a)
shall forfeit to the United States irrespective of any provision of State law - (1)
any property, real or personal, involved in the offense, including any chemical
weapon or biological weapon." Section 229B(c) states, "[t]he attorney General
shall provide for the destruction or other appropriate disposition of any chemi-
cal or biological weapon seized and forfeited pursuant to this section."
82. Title II, § 201 provides "the imposition of sanctions against any for-
eign government - (A) that has used chemical or biological weapons in viola-
tion of international law; or (B) that has used chemical or biological weapons
against its own nationals . . " (amending Title III of the Chemical and Bio-
logical Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991).
83. See id. at Title II, § 207. In particular, Section 207(a) of the Act states
that
(1) the threats posed by chemical and biological weapons
to the United States Armed forces dep loyed in regions of
concern will continue to grow and will undermine United
States strategies for the projection of United States mili-
tary power and the forward deployment of United States
Armed Forces; (2) the use of chemical and biological
weapons will be a likely condition of future conflicts in
regions of concern; (3) it is essential for the United States
and key regional allies of the United States to preserve
and further develop robust chemical and biological de-
fenses; (4) the United States Armed Forces, both active
and nonactive duty, are inadequately equipped, organized,
trained and exercised for operations in chemically and
biologically contaminated environments; (5) the lack of
readiness stems from a deemphasis by the executive
branch of government and the United States Armed
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ness, Congress found that
The armed forces of key regional allies and likely coa-
lition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support
United States military operations, are inadequately pre-
pared and equipped to carry out essential missions in
chemically and biologically contaminated environ-
ments; congressional direction contained in the 1997
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act is
intended to lead to enhanced domestic preparedness to
protect against the use of chemical and biological
weapons; and the United States Armed Forces should
place increased emphasis on potential threats to de-
ployed United States Armed Forces and, in particular
should make countering the use of chemical and bio-
logical weapons an organizing principle for United
States defense strategy and for the development of
force structure, doctrine, planning, training, and exer-
cising policies of the United States Armed Forces.M
C. The Defense Reform Initiative of 1997
In 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen sponsored the De-
fense Reform Initiative of 1997.85 The DRI was intended to apply
principles from business and industry to make the Department of De-
fense more effective and productive. 6 During the first year of the
DRI, the DOD recognized substantial savings from public-private
competition by moving into Internet-based electronic commerce, util-
izing ideas from the private sector, consolidating, streamlining, and
downsizing. s 7 Despite overall reductions in defense costs, the 1996
and 1997 acts assured that defense resources focused on the threat of
biological and chemical weapons would continue to increase. 8 One of
Forces on chemical and biological defense ....
84. Id. at Title II, §§ 207(a)(6)-(8).
85. See Frank Wolfe, Hamre: Possible Restructuring of FMS Process,
DEF. DAILY, Vol. 200, No. 36 (Oct. 9, 1998).
86. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 42 (containing an interim status
report of Deputy Secretary of Defense, John J. Hamre, on the Defense Reform
Initiative).
87. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 42. (Fact Sheet on first year ac-
complishments of the DRI); see also, DOD News Briefing, supra note 3 (dis-
cussing streamlining and downsizing as purposes of the DRI).
88. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 3 (stating that there is no intention
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the stated aims of the DRI is "to strengthen the Department's ability to
deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."8 9 Secre-
tary Cohen recognized this stating, "of the challenges facing the De-
partment of Defense in the future, none is greater than the threat posed
by the weapons of mass destruction." 90
The DTRA constituted the DOD's focal point in addressing this
complex and comprehensive problem. 91 As a result, the DTRA had a
budget of $1.9 billion and employed over 2,000 people in Fiscal Year
1999. 92 The increased spending indicated that reducing the threat of
biological and chemical warfare has become a national defense growth
industry.93
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DTRA
Under Title X of the National Defense Authorization Bill, the Sec-
retary of Defense possesses the authority to create an agency to con-
solidate DOD functions. 94 Under this authority, Secretary Cohen es-
tablished the DTRA. Its development9" began a substantial step toward
to cut capabilities in the area of national security threats from chemical and
biological weapons).
89. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Director
Selected, REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, May 19, 1998, available in
1998 WL 254687 (F.D.C.H.).
90. DOD News Briefing, supra note 3 (quoting Secretary of Defense, Wil-
liam Cohen).
91. See Defense Threat Reduction Agency Director Selected (released May
19, 1998) <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May1998/bos/91998_bt248-
98.html>; see also DOD News Briefing, supra note 3 (discussing the role of the
DTRA in stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction); DOD News
Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 14095333 (stat-
ing the DTRA becomes "the central nervous system for our counter-
proliferation plans and preparation.").
92. See DOD News Briefing, Improvements from Consolidation, supra
note 42.
93. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 3 (stating that facing the threat of
weapons of mass destruction "is likely to be ... a growth industry in the De-
partment of Defense.").
94. See House of Representatives Comm. on National Security Markup:
House Comm. on National Security Marks Up H.R. 3616, National Defense
Authorization Bill, 105th Cong. 155-56 (Statement of Rep. Rangel).
95. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 3. In response to a question re-
garding the idea of forming the DTRA, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John
J. Hamre, stated, "[The DTRA] grew very much out of Secretary Cohen's re-
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increased protection from the threat of chemical and biological weap-
ons. 96 By combining the expertise of three defense intelligence agen-
cies (DTSA, DSWA, and OSIA) and employing the knowledge of ex-
pert scientists in the field of biological and chemical warfare agents,
the DTRA appears to have the capability to effectively implement the
1996 and 1997 legislation. In addition, the DTRA's centralized exper-
tise should maximize efforts to discover chemical and biological
weapons production and stockpiling programs.
A. The Mission and Goals of the DTRA
The overall goal of the DTRA is to "reduce the present threat [of a
chemical or biological attack] and [to] prepare against the future threat
S. .9 The DTRA, however, was established with three broad mis-
sions in mind:98 (1) to maintain current U.S. nuclear deterrent capa-
bilities,99 (2) to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction,1°°
and (3) to counter threats of weapons of mass destruction.1°1 To ac-
complish its missions, the DTRA needs to learn how to anticipate at-
tacks, speed up response time, work with research and intelligence
communities, and protect technology.10 2 To satisfy these missions, the
DTRA will have to first understand the threat and second, determine
who or what constitutes a threat.
view last fall, about a year ago at this time .... [but] it represents a culmination
of a year's worth of change." Id.
96. See id. (discussing the significance of DTRA's establishment).
97. Id.
98. See DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 9, 1998, available in
1998 WL 14095333.
99. See id.
100. See id. The second mission includes elements such as treaty monitor-
ing and on-going support of confidence building measures. See id.
101. See id. The third mission involves a combination of responsibilities.
The DTRA will develop modeling and simulation skills for biological and
chemical weapons, building an intellectual infrastructure for biological and
chemical threats, as well as consequence management in its effort to counter
weapons of mass destruction threats. See id.; see also DOD News Briefing, su-
pra note 3 (discussing a variety of approaches such as treaty compliance, coop-
erative threat reduction, counterproliferation and active deterrence).
102. See DOD News Briefing, M2 PREsswiRE, July 9, 1998, available in
1998 WL 14095333.
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1. The First Step: Understanding the Threat
The first critical step the DTRA must take to accomplish its goals is
to collaborate with intelligence agencies to better understand the
threat. To achieve such an understanding, the DTRA proposes to work
with U.S. research and intelligence communities to identify evolving
threats and the intentions of those who would represent them.'0 3 Al-
though the formula for determining threats is not new to the DOD, the
DTRA's focus on evolution and intent is an untested methodology and
therefore is of uncertain value. For example, as stated by the Director
of the DTRA
[I]n the old days with the Soviet Union, you could do
the simple exercise that said capability, which was easy
to see and photograph; ... skip over intention because
they wouldn't have built [weapons] if they didn't have
an intention to use it; and... [determine the amount of]
threat with some confidence.... In the case of the do-
mestic application of a biological weapon, for example,
capability sits everywhere [and] you know almost
nothing about intent unless you in fact have penetrated
a fraternal or nearly religious organization. . . . [T]he
multiplication of those two together to get threat is a
much more uncertain activity. It makes it much harder
to do.' 4
Thus, the first goal of the DTRA is to develop relationships with
the intelligence community in an effort to better understand emerging
threats of chemical and biological weapons. In response to questions
at a DOD news briefing, the Director of the DTRA emphasized the
importance of working with the intelligence community, stating
[T]he intent is to be much more active .... We will be
working with the intelligence community to come up
with an integrated set of threat assessments [by creat-
ing] scenarios... coupling the intelligence to how you
would really act. You produce the best five or six sce-
narios you can, for example, for domestic events, and
then play them out and ask yourself how good was our
response, what in anticipation would have made the re-
sponse better, how do you go back to the intelligence
community and tell them to look for [a better
103. See DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 9, 1998, available in
1998 WL 104095333 (statement of Dr. Jay C. Davis, DTRA Director).
104. Id.
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response].05
2. The Second Step: Determining Who or What Is a Threat
Determining the source of the threat and building relationships with
countries and groups that might pose a threat constitutes the goals of
the DTRA's second step. 10 6 The first part is admittedly difficult and
requires the DTRA's partnership with intelligence agencies. Because
the threat is just as likely to stem from transnational, millenarian, or
religious groups, as opposed to national states, finding the actor is
much more difficult.
The second part, building relationships with countries and groups
that might pose a threat, is another daunting task for the DTRA. To
accomplish this, the DTRA will rely on the On-Site Inspection Agency
and its role in overseeing foreign treaty provisions compliance with
disarmament. The DTRA proposes to apply OSIA responsibilities
combined with multiple United Nations parties to build relationships
with countries that do not currently possess amicable relations with
the U.S.' '7 As admitted by the DTRA Director, this will involve "a fair
amount of politics and policy.'
08
B. Organization of the DTRA
The Director of the DTRA 10 9 reports directly to the Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology." 0 The Director's con-
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See id.; see also Treaty on Open Skies, art. XVI, S. Treaty Doc. No.
102-37 (1992). Ratified by the Senate in 1993, the treaty adopts a principle of
territorial openness to areas formerly restricted for national security concerns.
See Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to In-
ternational Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 98 (1994); see also Treaty on Open
Skies (visited on Mar. 22, 2000) <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/
openskie.htm> (for the text of the treaty).
108. DOD News Briefing, supra note 3 (response of Dr. Jay C. Davis,
DTRA Director).
109. Director Dr. Jay C. Davis is a nuclear physicist and former associate
director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. See Pincus, supra
note 1; Air Force Major General William F. Moore is the Deputy Director. See
DOD Agency Makes Debut, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1, 1998, available in
1998 WL 10315082.
110. See Defense Threat Reduction Agency Director Selected,
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
suiting advisors include senior officials from the Department of State,
the Department of Energy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as
well as a Threat Reduction Advisory Committee composed of distin-
guished policy, scientific and defense experts."' The DTRA also runs
the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO), an office re-
sponsible for analyzing emerging weapons of mass destruction threats
and the technologies and concepts to counter them."12 Eight director-
ates within the DTRA carry out these critical mission elements." 3
The merger of the DTSA, DSWA, and OSIA into the DTRA has not
been without criticism. Specifically, employees of the DTSA have
criticized the chain of command for the DTRA Director, who reports
to the Undersecretary for Acquisition and Technology. Previously, the
head of the DTSA - one element merged into DTRA - reported to the
Defense Undersecretary for Policy. Critics noted that this creates a
conflict of interest because the Undersecretary for Acquisition and
Technology seeks to keep the U.S. defense industry profitable through
REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, May 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL
254687. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology is Dr.
Jacques Gansler. See DOD Launches Threat Reduction Advisory Committee,
REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, July 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL
403599.
111. See The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Organization (visited Jan.
19, 1999) <http://www.dtra.mil/about/org.html>.
112. One responsibility of ASCO is planning. See DOD News Briefing,
supra note 3.
113. The directorates include: (1) Nuclear Support; (2) On-Site Inspection,
which is responsible for conducting on-site inspections and aerial monitoring
abroad, gathering information on the accuracy of treaty-related declarations
and weapons system reductions and building confidence among treaty mem-
bers; (3) Cooperative Threat Reduction, responsible for implementing the co-
operative threat reduction program and helping the countries of the former So-
viet Union destroy nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; (4) Technology
Security, which develops and implements policies on international transfers of
defense related goods, services and technologies to ensure that such transfers
are consistent with U.S. national security interests; (5) Special Weapons Tech-
nology; (6) Chem-Bio Defense is the focal point for technical expertise on
chemical and biological weapons; (7) Counterproliferation, which aims at re-
sponding to proliferation by developing new technologies, training responders,
and coordinating response planning for Department of Defense and other agen-
cies; and (8) The Force Protection which is responsible for protecting armed
forces and their families from acts of terrorism. See The Defense Threat Re-
duction Agency, Organization, supra note 111.
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the very sales that it would regulate. Critics contended that national
security becomes subordinate to free trade." 4 One DTSA employee,
for example, stated that this reorganization "will fatally compromise
controls on the export of dangerous technologies."'"15
In response, the DTRA's Deputy Secretary stressed the Defense
Undersecretary for Policy would retain overall supervision of export
controls and the intent was never to remove Policy's oversight respon-
sibility. The Secretary maintained that the developing fears in Con-
gress regarding the DTRA's role are a result of a misunderstanding of
his intent. The agency would do well, however, to better explain its
intent with regard to export controls and to formulate a chain of com-
mand with distinct reporting responsibilities.
The private sector is concerned about tighter export controls."
6
Since the end of the Cold War, fewer types of exports have been li-
censed by the U.S. government, making it easier for companies to ship
goods to countries once considered off-limits because of national se-
curity concerns. " 7 Yet, with the emerging threats of biological and
chemical warfare, restrictions on shipments of biological and chemical
warfare agents and missile technology have increased.
Under the 1949 Export Control Act, the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Export Administration (BEA) is authorized to restrict "dual
use" goods that have both civilian and military uses."' This includes
chemicals and biological agents that could be used to produce weap-
ons for attacking the U.S."19 The increased licensing requirements
present a resource problem for the BEA and mandate the involvement
114. See Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Pentagon's Alphabet Warfare,
NAT'L J., Sept. 12, 1998. Congressional Republicans such as Sen. Jon Kyl (R-
AZ) support these contentions, stating that the Clinton administration leans to-
ward granting export licenses. See id.
115. Id. A DTSA export license reviewer testified in Congress that the
DOD continually weakened in its ability to keep American technology from
leaving the borders. See id.
116. See Michael Laris, China Exploits U.S. Computer Advances; Ameri-
can Export Trade Raises National Security Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 9,
1999, at Al.
117. See Antiterrorism Efforts Threaten Shippers, AM. SHIPPER, Feb. 1,
1999.
118. See Export Control Act, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949), replaced by Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977); see also
Antiterrorism Efforts Threaten Shippers, AM. SHIPPER, Feb. 1, 1999.
119. See Antiterrorism Efforts Threaten Shippers, supra note 118.
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of other agencies such as the DTRA. The DTRA's role is not to grant
licenses, but to monitor the distribution of chemical and biological
agents that could be used in weapons.
As we move from the nuclear age to the information age, new
threats emerge. It therefore makes perfect sense to strengthen export
controls on chemicals and biological agents. Where the U.S. once
protected the export of weapons technology, it now must also protect
the export of information and scientific technology. The DTRA is or-
ganized to assist the BEA in this task.
III. THE DTRA: SOLUTION OR CONFLICT
A. The Need for the DTRA?
Before the development of the DTRA, the United States' main de-
fense against national security threats rested with agencies born during
the Cold War 120 designed to combat nuclear threats. 12' The DTRA was
deemed necessary because the threat from weapons of mass destruc-
tion posed significantly different challenges from those posed by nu-
clear threats, such as the likelihood of a "low-tech" attack by a small
group.' 22 In discussing this need, Deputy Secretary of Defense John J.
Hamre stated
the new era is a startlingly complicated era, one where
national security challenges are far more diverse and
far more complex. It no longer has the ease of thinking
about it in terms of a communist world and a free
world. . . . We needed to have a central organization
that was integrated in bringing all of these different
120. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
121. See statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John J. Hamre,
DOD News Briefing, supra note 3.
It has been ten years since the Berlin Wall came down.
As with every change in the security history of the United
States, there s a period of some transition when you sort
out what the last world was like and what is the new
world going to be like. In many ways I think this repre-
sents one of the very important milestones in this transi-
tion.
Id.
122. See id. Hamre stated, "The dispersal of weapons of mass destruction
capabilities into the hands of small groups that are driven by much more varied
motivations than those of the past presents a threat that unfortunately may be
obvious to us only after the fact." Id.
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strands together in one place.1
23
1. The Ineffectiveness of International Treaties and Conventions -
The Chemical Weapons Convention
In addition to the organizational issues and ongoing problems of in-
sufficient chemical and biological defense capabilities, 124 the U.S. has
voiced concerns that existing international treaties and conventions are
insufficient to diminish the threat of the use of weapons of mass de-
struction. 25 There are numerous reasons for their ineffectiveness.1
26
First, since the Chemical Weapons Convention does not extend to ter-
rorist groups, they are left unrestricted in their capacity to produce
chemical or biological weapons. 27 Second, the treaties have no direct
power over countries that do not ratify them. 28 These countries in-
clude Iraq, North Korea, and Libya,129 all of which are suspected of
123. Id.
124. See id. (discussing tests in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. show-
ing local law enforcement unpreparedness to handle a chem/bio attack); see
also DOD News Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL
14095333 (stating that the U.S. does not have the intellectual infrastructure for
biological and chemical threats the way the U.S. has for nuclear threats).
125. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 429.
126. For example, when the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion (BTWC) was drafted, it did not address the use of biological weapons be-
cause they were deemed to be useless by the military. See Detlev Vagts and
Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissi-
tudes of a Treaty in Force, 1975-85, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 984 (1990); see also
Falk, supra note 13, at 21 (discussing the shortcomings of the Geneva Proto-
col). The Geneva Protocol lacks consensus concerning the identity of toxic
agents included in the prohibition. See id. Parties have interpreted it as merely
prohibiting the first use of prohibited weaponry. See id. at 22. It prohibits
only the use of proscribed substances and does not prohibit research, develop-
ment, and possession. See id. at 23.
127. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 445-56; see also Ronald D. Rotunda,
The Chemical Weapons Convention: Political and Constitutional Issues, 15
CONST. COMMENTARY 131, 139 (1998) (discussing the difficulty of detecting
noncompliance from small groups).
128. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 446; see also Rotunda, supra note
127, at 135 (stating one inherent limitation of the CWC is that outlaw countries
can simply refuse to ratify it).
129. See Fitzgerald, supra note 11, at 446; see also Rotunda, supra note
127, at 135.
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producing weapons of mass destruction.1 30 While the threat of a direct
attack on the U.S. from one of these nations may appear minimal,
these nations may sell or convey their weapons to terrorist groups.
Such groups pose an even greater threat to the U.S. because they are
not easily detected or monitored. Third, the international treaties lack
provisions authorizing the use of military force to ensure
compliance.' 31 Instead, they authorize sanctions for countries in non-
compliance.' 32 Concerns have been raised that sanctions are an inap-
propriate response to such circumstances. 33 The Chemical Weapons
Convention is illustrative of this.
Iraq's refusal to cooperate with U.N. arms inspectors sent to gather
evidence as to whether Baghdad was developing weapons of mass de-
struction demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. 34 Although Iraq admitted to making VX gas for
weapons,' 35 it refused to allow U.N. inspectors to investigate its
chemical weapons program. 36 Iraqi officials maintained that until the
U.N. Security Council lifts the sanctions it imposed after the Gulf
War, they would not allow inspections.137 In return, U.N. officials
stated that the sanctions would not be lifted until the U.N. certified
130. See The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of
1997, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
131. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, at art. XII at 819.
132. See id. at art. XI.
133. See Stone, supra note 11, at A12 (discussing the use of sanctions
against Iraq, the author states "[m]any believe U.N. sanctions aimed at hurting
Saddam's government have instead devastated the Iraqi people. .. ").
134. See Bill Nichols, Clinton, Security Team Discuss Iraqi Problem, USA
TODAY, Nov. 9, 1998, at 12A.
135. See Senate Armed Services Comm. Hearing on Transnational Threats,
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of the Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, Under-
secretary of Defense for Policy) available in 1998 WL 11515924.
During the 1980's, Iraq developed an extensive chemical
weapons program and the most advanced biological war-
fare program in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein used a
combination of blister agents, such as mustard, and nerve
agents, such as Tabun, against the Iranians and the Kurds.
Iraq produced enough precursors for 400 tons of the nerve
agent VX per year.
Id.
136. See Security Briefs - Iraqi Nervegas Confirmed on Warheads, Jane's
Intelligence Review - POINTER 7, Nov. 1, 1998 [hereinafter Security Briefs].
137. See Nichols, supra note 134, at 12A.
20001
554 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 16:531
that Iraq destroyed its NCB weapons.138 This stalemate between Iraq
and the U.N. led to threatened military action by the United States.' 39
Although other Middle East states were less than enthusiastic, 40 the
United States began Operation Desert Fox on December 16, 1998. The
military operation deployed cruise missiles, which battered Iraqi mili-
tary targets and intelligence facilities. United States officials believed
the intelligence facilities held Iraq's Special Republican Guard that
protected Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs.
In addition, international law has not provided strong guidance in
controlling the threat of chemical and biological weapons."' The In-
ternational Court of Justice issued an Advisory Opinion in 1996 which
held that the use or threat of weapons of mass destruction "is generally
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts
except in an extreme circumstance in which a state's very survival
would be at stake.', 142 Such decision-making contributes little, creat-
ing an ineffective international climate for reducing the threat of
chemical and biological weapons.
2. How The DTRA Will Make a Difference
By placing increased emphasis on identifying transnational groups
that might be developing chemical or biological weapons to carry out
terrorist attacks in the United States, 143 the DTRA will help better
protect the nation against the threat of biological and chemical war-
fare. In addition, because the United States' power to respond is lim-
ited under the relevant international treaties and conventions, the
DTRA will provide a more appropriate response mechanism to the
threat of chemical and biological weapon attacks and discourage par-
138. See Security Briefs, supra note 136.
139. See Stone, supra note 11, at A12. In an effort to get support for a
possible military strike, Defense Secretary Cohen visited Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt. See id.
140. See id. Analysts at Washington think tanks, such as the Brookings In-
stitution, state that it is difficult to get the Saudis to agree to the use of military
force against Iraq. See id.
141. See Scott L. Silliman, Symposium: Contemporary Issues in Control-
ling Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 2 (1997).
142. Id.; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35
INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 809 (1996) (Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996).
143. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 3.
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ties who do not comply with international treaties and conventions.
44
The DTRA also intends to be more effective than its predecessors at
substantiating allegations of treaty violations. Prior to the establish-
ment of the DTRA, the U.N. relied on medical and technical experts to
investigate allegations, 145 often yielding inconclusive results.146 By
dedicating an agency such as the DTRA to investigate treaty compli-
ance and employing the expertise of OSIA officials within the DTRA,
conclusive evidence of violations should be more apparent.
47
For example, in October 1998, the DTRA sent a team of twelve in-
dividuals to Kosovo to monitor the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
and Serbian army compliance with a U.N. resolution calling for a
cease-fire.14 Although the DTRA members were unarmed observers,
they ran at least twenty-five patrols a day, moving in bright orange
vehicles. 49 At the end of each day, the patrols reported the day's
events to U.S. embassies, the Secretary of State, and the National Se-
curity Council. During this period of observation, the DTRA members
stated that they worked extremely hard at maintaining their neutrality
toward the Serbian authorities, the KLA, and the local populace. One
member stated
People would talk to us. Both sides would talk to us.
144. The DTRA's counterproliferation directorate prepares U.S. leaders to
respond when weapons of mass destruction are discovered by studying prolif-
eration threats, developing new technologies, training responders and planning
across DOD and other agencies. The DTRA also leads the DOD in supporting
operational forces. See Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Counterprolifera-
tion (visited Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.dtra.mil/counter/counter.html>.
145. See Falk, supra note 13, at 18-19; see also G.A. Res. 144C, 35th
Sess., U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 48, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/35/687 (1980) (discussing
the General Assembly's request for medical and technical experts to investi-
gate allegations that chemical/biological agents were being used in Southeast
Asia).
146. See Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of the Secretary-
General, 37th Sess., agenda item 54, U.N. Doc. A/37/259 at 49 (1982).
147. The DTRA's On-Site Inspection directorate is primarily responsible
for monitoring activities and developing treaty verification monitoring tech-
nologies, conducting on-site inspections and aerial monitoring abroad.
148. See Threat Reduction Agency Dozen Lead Observer Force,
PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF. NEWS CAPSULES, Feb. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL
8510602. In 1998, fighting between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Ser-
bian army and police caused an estimated 1,500 deaths and displaced an esti-
mated 230,000 people from their homes. See id.
149. See id.
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I think the local Albanians were glad we were
there. Within our region, there were three shootings -
three Albanians were killed. Tensions were always high
and we were unarmed. We were always a target. There
was a cease-fire in place and violence was limited, but
the feeling of being threatened was constant.
1 50
The team realized the importance of its presence. As was described
by another member, "I had one individual tell me, 'If you leave, we
leave."' 51 The DTRA team members also realized the effect of their
presence. 152 More than fifty families returned to one area described as
a "ghost town" before the DTRA trucks arrived. 5 3 Others in the
DTRA saw the impact of the mission on a personal level. One member
stated, "I was in a shop and an elderly Albanian woman hugged me
and kissed me. We ended up talking to her about 30 minutes about
how she felt safer since we were there."'
' 54
Although the DTRA's presence in Kosovo was not to uncover
treaty violations with respect to chemical or biological weapons, its
accomplishments in Kosovo are representative of the success of the
DTRA in international situations. The DTRA Team Leader, U.S.
Army Lt. Col. Leonard Blevins stated, "Some people on the mission
from outside the DTRA and the DOD had never been faced with this
type of situation before. I really believe our folks were the glue that
held it together."'
55
The DTRA also indirectly supports Russia's compliance with the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. 56 Specifically, the DTRA provides
funding to Thiokol Propulsion, a division of Cordant Technologies
Inc., to design and construct electrical supply lines, gas lines, product
storage tanks, and control systems for the disposal of Russian missile
fuel.' Funding is supplied as part of the DTRA's Cooperative Threat
Reduction program. 5 8 These efforts are yet another example of the
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See Threat Reduction Agency Dozen Lead Observer Force, su-
pra note 148.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Thiokol Team Continues Construction of Missile Fuel Disposition
Site, AEROSPACE DAILY, Jan. 8, 1999, at 42, available in 1999 WL 9476637.
157. See id.
158. See id.; see also Greg Seigle, Ukraine Aims to Mirror US Threat Re-
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DTRA's ability to work globally in facilitating treaty compliance.
B. Proper Spending? Should Money be Spent to Improve
Public Health Facilities and Educate Doctors Instead
of on the DTRA?
Three programs have the unique potential to mitigate the effect of a
chemical or biological attack and assist in domestic preparedness. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Net-
work of Electronic Communications, and the National Domestic Pre-
paredness Office can reduce the threats by helping to identify and
control outbreaks, providing clear paths of communication, and pre-
paring local land state first responders.
The CDC promotes health and quality of life by preventing and
controlling disease. It is the lead domestic agency for disease surveil-
lance and prevention and often collaborates with' the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Health
Organization to control infectious disease problems in foreign coun-
tries.' 59 The CDC has also worked with the Defense Department to de-
velop surveillance mechanisms to monitor outbreaks of infectious dis-
eases. 60 In 1995, representatives from twenty different United States
government agencies reviewed the United States' role in detecting and
responding to outbreaks of diseases. They made nineteen recommen-
dations to the U.S. government emphasizing that "a global disease
surveillance and response network could enable the United States to
respond quickly and effectively in the event of an attack involving
duction, JANE'S DEF. WKLY, Jan 20, 1999 (discussing the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program and its responsibilities in the former Soviet Union).
159. See Comm. on the Appropriations, of the Subcomm. on*Foreign Op-
erations, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of James M. Hughes, Director, Na-
tional Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion.) [hereinafter Foreign Operations]. In 1978, the CDC and USAID worked
with the WHO to eradicate smallpox. See id. CDC also assisted countries that
do not host USAID missions, such as China, where CDC supports influenza
surveillance sites; Hong Kong, to contain the recent outbreak of avian influ-
enza; and the Sudan, documenting epidemic levels of African trypanosomiasis.
See id.
160. See Air Force, CDC Agree to Conduct Joint Programs, REGULATORY
INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, Apr. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 894922.
20001
558 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 16:531
biological or chemical warfare."' 161 Additionally, they noted that "the
experience gained in controlling naturally occurring microbes will en-
hance [the United States'] ability to cope with a biological warfare
agent should the need arise.'
' 62
Collaborative reports such as these strengthen the United States' ca-
pacity to detect and respond to the threat of biological terrorism. In
addition, initiatives such as the two-year outbreak investigation pro-
gram, enable the CDC to address the threat of biological warfare.
63
With its expertise in controlling the spread of infectious diseases, the
CDC is a logical partner for the DTRA.
Increased spending on the CDC and other U.S. health organizations
will aid the fight against the threat of chemical and biological warfare.
These organizations have identified a long list of unforeseen infectious
disease problems. 64 The experiences of these organizations in identi-
fying diseases, along with their already developed programs could be
adapted to detect chemical weapons and biological agents. For exam-
ple, in 1997, an avian strain of influenza that had never before at-
tacked humans began to kill previously healthy people in Hong
Kong. 65 Later that year, CDC learned that vancomycin, a last resort
antibiotic, began to lose its power to cure infections caused by
staphylococcus aureus, a common bacterium that can cause critical ill-
ness. 66 This same expertise that the CDC has demonstrated regarding
infectious disease identification and protection could be used to iden-
tify the location of biological weapons and reduce the threat of chemi-
cal and biological warfare.
The CDC and other public health groups, however, have not re-
ceived the DTRA's level of funding. For example, in Fiscal Year
1998, USAID received $50 million to strengthen global surveillance
and control of infectious diseases, 67 a small amount compared to the
DTRA's 1999 budget of approximately $2 billion.
161. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of
James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.).
162. Id.
163. See Air Force, CDC Agree to Conduct Joint Programs, supra note
160.
164. See Foreign Operations, supra note 159.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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The CDC has a positive relationship with several foreign countries
making it an essential partner in confronting the threat of chemical and
biological warfare. The CDC historically has played a key role in as-
sisting foreign governments in protecting against infectious disease
outbreaks.168 As a result, collaborative efforts between the DTRA and
the CDC on foreign soil could enhance the DTRA's threat reduction
efforts.
Furthermore, the CDC has experience dealing with prolonged in-
fectious disease outbreaks. CDC staff have responded to several ex-
traordinarily serious situations requiring numerous personnel over ex-
tended periods of time. CDC personnel went to the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo in 1995 during an Ebola hemorrhagic fever out-
break and to Kenya during an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in 1998.
Thus, the CDC staff could provide extensive knowledge to the DTRA
of disease conditions and survivability rates in the event of a biologi-
cal attack.
A second potentially productive DTRA alliance would be with the
recently established National Association of County and City Health
Officials (NACCHO). NACCHO represents 3,000 public health de-
partments in the U.S. and is dedicated to increasing nationwide disease
surveillance. 169 Because a hospital is often the first entity to recognize
public health threats, it is necessary that the hospital be able to com-
municate quickly and disseminate possible infectious disease out-
breaks to other hospitals. In recognition of this, NACCHO proposes
increased funding to develop a national network of electronic commu-
nications among public health agencies to protect communities from
the public health consequences of acts of terrorism. 70 In stark contrast
to the funding the DTRA receives, 171 local public health departments
168. See id. For example, in 1997, CDC sent personnel to 145 countries for
scientific exchange and technical assistance and provided diagnostic support
for hundreds of local investigations. See id.
169. See Senate Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on Labor, Health and
Human Services, Education and Related Agencies, 105th Cong. (1998), avail-
able in 1998 WL 285767 (discussing the importance of disease surveillance at
local, state and federal levels).
170. See id. (stating that few of us in public health are familiar with the
prevention, diagnosis or treatment of the health effects from agents of biologi-
cal warfare).
171. See DOD News Briefing, supra note 3; see also DOD News Briefing,
supra note 22. The NATO Workshop on political-military decision-making
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are significantly underfundedf 7 2 Increased funding and better elec-
tronic communications for local health departments will clearly aid the
DTRA mission. By linking disease surveillance functions of local
public health departments with the DTRA's knowledge of chemical
and biological threats, the U.S. will be better prepared to answer
chemical or biological attacks.
A third area where spending could be increased is the proposed Na-
tional Domestic Preparedness Office. 173 Increased spending for this
entity is important because public health agencies will be the first to
respond to, and contend with, the aftermath of a chemical or biological
attack. Greater funding will help provide local and state agencies with
better training, equipment and resources to deal with this emerging
threat.
The National Domestic Preparedness Office is intended to serve as a
single point of contact to assist state and local authorities in the event
of a chemical or biological attack.' 74 The Office's mission is to focus
on planning, training, exercises, equipment and research development,
information and intelligence sharing, and health and medical issues.1
7 5
An advisory group will compliment the Office and serve as a bridge
between federal domestic preparedness programs and the needs and
stated, "[w]e will spend over $5 billion on chemical and biological protection
and counterproliferation over the next six years. Major emphasis is to develop
remote detection systems and non-aqueous diagnostic techniques." Id.
172. See Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and
Related Agencies of the Senate Comm. On Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1998),
available in 1998 WL 285767, stating
About one-half of all local health departments don't have
the use of electronic mail. At least one thousand local
health departments have no access to any on-line or Inter-
net service. Among those that do, one-third are not even
linked to their state health department, and fewer than
one-quarter can reach other health departments electroni-
cally. In some health departments, up to five employees
must share one computer.
Id.
173. See Subcomm. for the Department of Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Comm. On Appropriations,
105th Cong. (1999) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) available in 1999 WL 8084457. The National Domestic Prepar-
edness office would operate under the auspices of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigations. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
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priorities of states and local communities. 6 The Office plans to em-
ploy a "coordinator" in each FBI field office who will serve as the
primary point of contact for state and local emergency first respond-
ers.
177
C. Conflicting Duties: Interagency Competition, the Fourth
Amendment, and International Agreements
1. Interagency Competition
Senate Hearings in 197517' and 1989179 evidenced the strong role of
the CIA in countering the threat of chemical and biological weapons
attacks. "It's inherently a law enforcement, an emergency response re-
sponsibility of the United States, but ... [DoD is the only agency] in
the entire federal government that . . . [has] mobilization
capabilities."' 80 Yet, agencies other than the Department of Defense
have the lead responsibility in the U.S. when there is an incident in-
volving terrorist activity. 81 Such conflicts of authority between the
DOD, law enforcement, and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency could generate interagency competition despite the DTRA's
statements that it will work with other agencies to combat the threat of
biological and chemical warfare.
8 2
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents: Hearings Before the S.
Select Comm. to Study Gov 't Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
94th Cong. 1st Sess., at 11 (1975). Then Director of the CIA, William Colby
referred to four "functional categories" of CIA activity, including "assessment
and maintenance of biological and chemical disseminating systems for opera-
tional" use and "providing technical support and consultation on request from
offensive and defensive [biological/chemical warfare]." Id.; see also Falk, su-
pra note 13, at 29.
179. See Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, Hearings on the Global
Spread of Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1989) (Testimony of William H. Webster, Director of the CIA); see also Paul
Rubenstein, State Responsibility for Failure to Control the Export of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 319, 323 (1993).
180. DOD News Briefing, supra note 3.
181. See id.
182. See Laura Myers, THE MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 1998, at 5.
John Pike, a security analyst for the Federation of American Scientists stated
"[t]he CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and others don't work closely
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2. The Fourth Amendment
A large portion of the DTRA's responsibilities falls within the cate-
gory of domestic weapons' inspection. This has the potential to raise
constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment. Inevitably,
situations will arise in which a DTRA authorized search for chemical
or biological agents will intrude upon a citizen's right to be free from
"unreasonable searches and seizures" as required by the Fourth
Amendment. 8 3 For example, DTRA agents might locate the head-
quarters of a known anti-government group and want to search for
evidence of biological agents. The DTRA might suspect that the group
has small amounts of VX gas that it could unleash within the hour at
the offices of a nearby multinational corporation. Under the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the DTRA could possibly inspect the group's
headquarters without a search warrant.1 84 Moreover, the DTRA could
seize samples, inspect documents and take photographs before a judge
made a determination of probable cause.185 Although authorized by the
CDC, 8 6 DTRA inspections of domestic facilities would surely raise
Fourth Amendment challenges. In addition, the DTRA would be held
to the same Fourth Amendment standards when inspecting foreign
weapons facilities.
8 7
3. International Agreements
The establishment of the DTRA may also cause potential conflicts
with the endorsement of international agreements. For example, Arti-
cle 24 of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council "primary respon-
sibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"',8 8 and
enough." Id.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184. See Rotunda, supra note 127, at 149.
185. See id.
186. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, at art. IV. The
Chemical Weapons Convention applies to both governments and private indi-
viduals and allows inspection of publicly or privately owned places where tar-
geted chemical weapons may be produced. See id.
187. See Rotunda, supra note 127, at 143 (citing Reidv. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957) (plurality opinion). "Searches that violate the Fourth Amendment are
not cured by the simple expediency of a treaty ratification or an executive
agreement." Id.
188. Rubenstein, supra note 179, at 342.
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its resolutions are "absolutely binding on all member states."'89 It is
conceivable that the DTRA's primary role in this area will be to en-
sure that countries are complying with these resolutions. The DTRA
however, must play a limited role in the enforcement of treaty viola-
tions to comply with the U.N. charter.' 90
IV. CONCLUSION
Establishing the DTRA provides the United States with the capabil-
ity of dealing with the new era of chemical and biological weapons.
History shows that international treaties and conventions have failed
to deter terrorist groups and countries from producing and using such
weapons. The DTRA provides a means to protect the nation from the
unique threat of weapons of mass destruction. However, the DTRA is
not sufficient by itself to supply this protection. Additional spending is
necessary to fund the civilian health departments and to educate doc-
tors on how to respond to outbreaks caused by these weapons. At the
same time, the United States should not rely solely on the DTRA to
reduce the overall threat, as every threat cannot be discovered. The
health industry must also be adequately prepared in the event that ter-
ror strikes.
189. See id.
.190. Typically, remedies for violation of international law are reparation,
in the form of either compensation, restitution or satisfaction. See id. at 366.
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